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Abstract—The market-based augmentation of the high voltage 
transmission systems as a legacy of the previous regulated 
regimes has been a challenging issue for the central transmission 
entities. The economic assessment framework for transmission 
upgrades or expansion projects, considering the interaction of the 
central transmission entity (CTE) with the electricity market 
management (MMC) company both as independent players 
needs to be addressed appropriately at least in the National 
Electricity Market, Australia. 
To assist in bridging this gap, this paper introduces a novel 
metric, namely, the L-Shape Area, for the economic assessment 
of the transmission expansion options. The proposed 
methodology employs a von Stackelberg game for the interaction 
modelling of the central transmission entity and the market 
management company. The upper subproblem minimises the 
objective of the CTE as the leader player and the lower 
subproblem solves the security-constrained economic dispatch as 
the follower subproblem. 
The bi-level programming problem has been solved by 
applying the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions to the follower 
subproblem and the use of a gradient search method to solve the 
resultant single level non-linear programming problem. 
A modified IEEE 14-bus test system has been used to show the 
effectiveness of the proposed formulation. 
 
Index Terms— High Voltage Transmission System, Market-
Based Augmentation, von Stackelberg Game 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The National Electricity Market, Australia, (NEM) is a 
gross pool with Queensland, New South Wales, Australian 
Capital Territory, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania as 
participating jurisdictions. Generators sell their electricity to 
the pool and customers buy their required electric energy from 
the pool. The main customers are retailers which buy 
electricity to resell it to the household and business customers. 
While it is possible for an end-use customer to buy directly 
from the pool, few choose this option [1]. The National 
Electricity Management Company is the market operator [2].  
 
The NEM in eastern and southern Australia has a 
combination of state-based transmission networks and cross-
border interconnectors that connect the states together [3]. The 
Queensland transmission system with the total line length of 
around 11902km and the maximum demand of 8232MW is 
one of the longest transmission systems in the NEM. 
Powerlink is a regulated monopoly business responsible for 




Queensland to providing all NEM participants with open 
and non-discriminatory access [2].  
 
Powerlink, as the Central Transmission Entity (CTE), is in 
charge of transmission planning and operation within the state 
of Queensland. This central transmission entity bears any 
transmission investment cost. Unlike the reliability-based 
planning approach, the market-based augmentation approach 
has not been accommodated properly in the Queensland 
transmission planning methodology.  
 
In [4], the author has done a peer review on the available 
methodologies for the market-based augmentation of high 
voltage transmission systems. Development of a 
comprehensive metric for measuring the market value of the 
transmission expansion options is the very critical issue. This 
issue must be addressed as the first step in market-based 
augmentation of the high voltage transmission systems. 
Accordingly, in [5], the author has done an analytical review 
on the most comprehensive metrics used in the economic 
assessment of transmission expansion projects in competitive 
electricity markets. An exact definition along with its 
mathematical formulation has been provided for each 
introduced metric. In [5], around 100 papers have been 
reviewed and 40 of them have been discussed. Aggregated 
surplus, congestion revenue, market players’ surplus, 
redispatch power, and redispatch cost have been used as the 
metrics for the electricity market efficiency measuring. 
Flatness of price profile, Lerner index, Quantity weighted 
Lerner index, Residual Supply index, and Herfindahl-
Hirshman index have been employed for the measuring of 
competitiveness in electricity market. As it is clear, these 
indices can evaluate electricity market only based on either 
efficiency or competitiveness. The lack of a comprehensive 
metric for accommodating the efficiency and competitiveness 
of electricity market is clear from above survey.  
 
On the other hand the interaction of central transmission 
entity and market management company in the market-based 
augmentation of transmission system has not received enough 
attention.  
 
Covering the aforementioned shortcomings, this paper 
proposes a novel metric, namely, the L-Shape Area criterion 
as a measure of the performance of the electricity market. The 
CTE and MMC interaction has been modelled as the leader-
follower von Stackelberg game. The leader is the CTE with 
the objective function of the investment cost of transmission 
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upgrade or expansion project and the L-Shape Area criterion. 
The security-constrained economic dispatch is solved as the 
MMC’s central dispatch process. This paper is organised in 
five sections and two appendices. The mathematical 
formulation of the problem is detailed in section II. Section III 
deals with the solution of the problem using the von 
Stackelberg game. This section also includes the Kuhn-Tucker 
optimality conditions and gradient search method in solving 
the resultant bi-level programming problem.  
 
II.  THE MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM 
A.  L-Shape Area Metric 
The introduction of competitive markets aims to reduce 
prices, improve the quality of services, and on a long-term 
basis make the market more efficient [6]. Providing an 
environment for perfect competition between generators on 
one side of market and between retailers on the other side is 
the necessary condition in achieving the aforementioned 
targets.  
 
The conditions required for perfect competition are, [7]: 
 
(1) a large number of generators producing the same product; 
(2) each generator attempts to maximise its payoff; 
(3) each generator is a price taker; 
(4) generators have exact knowledge of all parameters of 
significance to their decisions; 
(5) transmission is costless. 
 
The first condition aims to prevent the formation of market 
concentration in terms of Herfindahl-Hirshman Index and 
pivotal generators in terms of Residual Supply Index [8]. 
Having rational generators is the immediate consequence of 
second condition, [9]. Given rational generators, when a 
generator is a price taker, mathematically it can be shown that 
maximising its profit requires bidding its marginal cost, [10]. 
Condition four says that the generators have perfect 
information. Finally, the last condition addresses bottlenecks 
in the high voltage transmission systems. Bottlenecks are one 
of the major issues in market separation. Arguably, none of 
these conditions ever exists in a real electricity market. 
Accordingly, the real electricity market has deviation from the 
perfect competitive electricity market. Measuring this 
deviation has been addressed in a few publications with some 
degree of success.  
 
This paper proposes a novel metric for measuring the 
performance of the electricity market. The L-Shape area 
criterion, , can accommodate the efficiency and 
competitiveness measuring of the electricity market in one 
comprehensive metric. The L-Shape area metric is designed 
based on measuring the deviation of the real electricity market 
from an ideal one. This paper defined an ideal electricity 
market as one which satisfies all five previous explained 
conditions. 
 
In terms of mathematical derivation throughout this paper 
the bold letters enclosed by [] are matrices, bols letters are 
vectors and unbold letters are scalar quantities. 
 
Definition of L-Shape Area Metric (AL-Shape): Let  and  
be the nonempty vectors in  representing nodal prices 
($/MWh) and let 0 and 0 be the aggregated 
served demand of retailers (MWh) in ideal and real electricity 
market respectively. If Δ  is the Euclidean norm of the vector 
 as in (1), 
                               Δ                                      (1) 
then 0 ($/h) is; Δ  (2) 
Note that all elements of vector  are the same and equal 
to . 












Fig. 1, L-Shape Area Metric 
 
 
Based on the AL-Shape criterion, the following theorem can be 
developed. 
 
Theorem: The necessary and sufficient condition for perfect 
competition in an electricity market is that: 
 
                              AL-Shape=0                                           (3) 
 
Proof: see appendix I. 
 
 
Subsection B deals with mathematical modelling of the central 
transmission entity as the leader player.  
B.  Central Transmission Entity (CTE)  
Suppose a CTE has m upgrade options and n expansion 
options for the market-based augmentation of the high voltage 
transmission system in its given territory. For the m upgrade 
options,  , 1, … ,  and for the n expansion options,  
, 1, … ,  are the vectors of maximum thermal capacity 
which can be built on the transmission corridors of upgrade 
and expansion, respectively. Similarly,  , 1, … ,  and 
 , 1, … ,  are the vectors of the investment cost for the 
transmission upgrade and expansion projects, respectively. 
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Fig.2, CTE’s transmission projects 
 
Since the CTE pays the investment cost of upgrade or 
expansion, it is desirable to upgrade and/or expand the 
transmission system with the minimum cost. Mathematically, 
the CTE’s cost function can be formulated as (4). 
  Π    . .  0  1, … ,  0  1, … ,      (4) 
 
 and  are the maximum values for the  and  as the 
CTE’s design parameters.  and  where  1 are the 
weighting factors which are set by the design engineer based 
on his judgement on the value of transmission investment 
compared with the value of electricity market performance.  
 
Market clearing process as the main responsibility of MMC 
is detailed in subsection C. 
 
C.  Market Management Company (MMC) 
Considering the National Electricity Market in Australia, 
suppose that the electricity market is a double-sided gross 
pool. MMC collects the bids and uses a security-constrained 
economic dispatch process for clearing market. With NG 
registered generators and NR registered retailers in the market, 
vectors  and  are the apparent marginal cost of NG 
generators and the value of lost load for the NR retailers. 
Accordingly, the mathematical formulation of the security-
constrained economic dispatch has been given in (5).  






In (5),  and  are 1  and 1  
matrix where the column related to the slack bus is 
omitted,  and  are the total number of buses and total 
number of lines in the system.  is the vector of bus angles 
and  and  are the generation level of committed generators 
and the served demand of retailers. , , and  act as the 
decision variable of (5). These variables are bounded by their 
minimum and maximum values. Existing capacity of the 
transmission system has been modelled through vector . 
 
The interaction of CTE and MMC for the market-based 
augmentation of the transmission system has been modelled 
through a bilevel optimisation problem. The leader makes its 
decision and the follower takes the leader’s decision and 
optimises its situation. Section III deals with the mathematical 
formulation of the market-based augmentation based on a von 
Stackelberg game. Solution of the problem using a modified 
gradient search method is detailed afterward.   
 
III.  VON STACKELBERG GAMING WITH COMPLETE 
INFORMATION  
The static version of the non-cooperative, two-person game 
introduced by von Stackelberg, [11], is used for the market-
based augmentation of the high voltage transmission system. 
Perfect information is assumed so that both players, CTE and 
MMC, know the objective and feasible choices available to 
the other. The fact that the game is said to be static implies 
that each player has only one move. CTE moves first and 
minimises its objective function taking into account all 
possible responses from MMC, the MMC observes the CTE’s 
decision and clears the market by solving (5). 
 
The complete problem formulation has been given in (6). 
  Π    . .  0  1, … ,  0  1, … ,  




  (6) 
 
Programming problem (6) can be categorised as the non-
linear bilevel programming problem. Generally, non-linear 
bilevel programming programs are intrinsically hard [12]. 
Even the simplest form of the linear-linear bilevel 
programming problems has been proved to be -hard by 
[13] and strong  -hard by [14].  
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Branch and bound algorithm [15], steepest descent 
direction [16], ,sensitivity and gradient method [17], and 
heuristic methods have been proposed for solving bilevel 
programming problem. This paper employs the gradient 
search method for solving the bilevel programming problem. 
 
The MMC’s central dispatch process can be generalized in 
(7). 




The introduced vectors and matrices in (7) in terms of vectors 
and matrices in (6) are defined in appendix II.  
The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions [18], [19] for (7) yield 
to the following sets of equalities. 
 
 
 .  0 ,  (8) 
 
In (8),  is the vector of slack variables.  
 
CTE has two decision vectors, namely,  and  which are 
a part of vectors  and  respectively. Simplifying (8) and 




  0  9  
 
Using the transpose properties of 
and , (9) can be written in the 
following matrix form; 
 10  
In (10), vector  includes the gradient 
components of Π as the leader objective function. In some 
cases, the rank of left hand side matrix of (10) is lower than 
the number of variables in (10). In these cases, singular value 
decomposition methodology has been employed as one of the 
best methods for solving least-squares problems [20].  
 
The partial derivative of the Π with respect to the  can be 
found as in (11). 
 Π Δ  1, … ,  (11) 
Since Π is not continuously differentiable at λ , the 
Euclidian norm  , where y is the normal definition of 
second norm, is used as .  is a very small real number 
,in our study 0.0001, that makes Π continuously differentiable 
at λ . 
Using the gradient search, the algorithm starts with an initial 
guess for the  , 1, … ,  and update the value of  
based on the equation (12). 
 Π  12  
Where  is the step length of movement to the new solution. If 
the new value of the  is not in the specified boundary, the 
algorithm sets the new value to the upper or lower bound of 
the  based on the violating of upper or lower bound 
respectively. 
as the second decision variable of CTE can be found by the 
same process.  
The iterative process stops when there is no further change in 
the CTE’s decision variables.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
Employing the static version of a von Stackelberg game, a 
new strategy has been developed for the market-based 
augmentation of the high voltage transmission systems. The 
new strategy models the Central Transmission Entity and 
Market Management Company as two players with their 
associated cost functions. In defining the central transmission 
entity‘s cost function, a novel metric has been developed for 
the performance measuring of the electricity market. The so-
called  criterion can accommodate the efficiency and 
competitiveness measurement of the electricity market in one 
comprehensive metric. Although,  has been 
developed for the market-based augmentation, it can be used 
as a monetary index for measuring the electricity market 
performance. 
The ultimate goal of the electricity market restructuring is 
the bridging the generators and retailers through independent 
transmission companies to provide competition at all levels of 
the electricity supply chain. Addressing this goal, the 
extension of von Stackelberg game for modelling different 
competing independent transmission companies would be a 
promising mathematical framework for a possible future with 
independent transmission companies.  
And the last but not the least, since all concepts and 
theories developed throughout this paper is based on the 
current operation of the Eastern Australian Transmission 
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system and its operating electricity market, t
engaged in the application of the proposed
Eastern Australian Transmission system. 
 
V.  APPENDIX I : 0 Δ  Δ   1
   1   1 Δ   , 2  1
 Δ 1 1  1    
  4   1   Δ 0 
   0  
 
VI.  APPENDIX II 
The introduced vectors and matrices in (7) in








 and  are the matrices which
transmission connection buses of the regis
and retailers in the electricity market.  
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